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Labor and Employment
W. Jonathan Martin II*
Patricia-Anne Brownback**
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on recent cases concerning federal labor and
employment laws.1 The following is a discussion of those opinions.2
II. TITLE VII OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII)3 does not allow employers
to discriminate based on the protected classes of: race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.4 This includes limiting, segregating, or
classifying employees “in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”5 For employees to prove
disparate impact under Title VII, they must demonstrate that the
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1. For analysis of labor and employment law during the prior Survey period, see W.
Jonathan Martin II & Patricia-Anne Brownback, Labor and Employment Law, Eleventh
Circuit Survey Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 1219 (2021).
2. This Article will focus solely on published opinions by the Eleventh Circuit
because these are binding precedent on the court.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1991).
5. Id.
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employer used a particular employment practice on the basis of one of
the above protected classes and the employer cannot show that the
alleged practice is job related and related with business necessity.6
“[T]he plaintiff in an employment discrimination lawsuit always has the
burden of demonstrating that, more probably than not, the employer
took an adverse employment action against him on the basis of a
protected personal characteristic.”7 Generally, employees are unable to
utilize the “traditional framework” of direct evidence to prove their
case, so the Supreme Court of the United States developed a three-part,
burden-shifting analysis to “make matters somewhat easier for
plaintiffs in employment discrimination suits” using circumstantial
evidence.8
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, one must first present a
prima facie case of discrimination.9 Once a plaintiff meets this initial
burden, the burden of production shifts to the employer to “articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employe[r]’s
[action].”10 After this, the plaintiff, who retains the burden of
persuasion throughout, must then “show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant’s legitimate reasons were not the reasons
that actually motivated its conduct, that the reasons were merely a
‘pretext for discrimination.’”11
A. Adverse Action under Title VII
In Davis v. Legal Services Alabama, Inc.,12 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held, as a matter of first impression, a
paid suspension alone was not an adverse action for the purposes of
Title VII and Section 1981 claims.13 Arthur Davis, an African American,
became the Executive Director of Legal Services Alabama (LSA) in 2016
and started having issues with his employees shortly after he began.
Subsequently, some of the employees complained to LSA’s Executive
Committee. The Executive Committee voted to suspend Davis with pay
pending investigation into the complaints. Following the suspension,
LSA posted a security guard outside of the office and hired a political
consultant, who happened to be a foe of Davis, to handle any public
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (1991).
Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1290 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
Id.
MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 (11th Cir. 1991).
19 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1267.
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relations related to the matter. Four days after notification of his
suspension, Davis submitted his resignation. He filed suit alleging race
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII. The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama determined that Davis
was not subject to an adverse action. This was fatal to his claims as
Davis could not overcome the initial burden14 under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis.15
Here, the question considered by the court was whether a simple
paid suspension was an adverse action under Title VII or section 1981.16
Consistent with every other circuit, the court held that it was not,
reasoning that a paid suspension is a “useful tool for an employer to hit
‘pause’ and investigate when an employee has been accused of
wrongdoing.”17 Here, Davis did not disagree. However, Davis argued
that his suspension was not just a simple paid suspension. Davis
argued that the paid suspension was converted into an adverse action
because LSA also disclosed the suspension to the political consultant;
the suspension occurred days before a high-profile LSA reception with
the State Bar; the Executive Committee issued a suspension letter; and
LSA placed a guard outside the building.18 The Eleventh Circuit
disagreed, concluding that there was no evidence that any of these
actions were intended to embarrass Davis, or that any of LSA’s actions
were out of the ordinary from their normal practice.19 Therefore, the
paid suspension was not an adverse action and his claim failed.20
B. Religious Discrimination
In Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Services, Inc.,21 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia’s grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff, Bataski Bailey’s
claims of religious discrimination, religious failure to accommodate, and
retaliation.22 Bailey applied online for a part-time paramedic position
14. To establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination, a plaintiff must show
that “(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to adverse
employment action; (3) her employer treated similarly situated white employees more
favorably; and (4) she was qualified to do the job.” McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370,
1373 (11th Cir. 2008).
15. Davis, 19 F.4th at 1264–65.
16. Id. at 1266.
17. Id. at 1267.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 992 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2021).
22. Id. at 1268–69.
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with Metro Ambulance Services, Inc. (AMR). On his application Bailey
selected that he had never been fired or asked to resign from a job.
Bailey was subsequently hired and during orientation Bailey was
informed that his facial hair, a goatee, was in violation of the grooming
policy for emergency transports. Bailey was a practicing Rastifarian,
and an important part of the religion is growing facial hair because it is
seen as sacred.23
Bailey disagreed with the policy and took his concerns up the chain
from his lieutenant to Human Resources.24 Bailey was told that if he
wanted to keep the facial hair that he could work on the non-emergency
transport side for AMR.25 Unhappy with this response, Bailey
threatened suit. Upon learning of the threat of litigation, AMR’s inhouse counsel started to conduct due diligence on Bailey by googling
him. During this investigation, the in-house counsel found a lawsuit
Bailey brought against his former employer for wrongful termination.
Bailey submitted a declaration stating that he was terminated from the
Company, which was inconsistent with his answer on his application for
AMR. Because Bailey refused to work non-emergency and he was not in
compliance with the grooming policy to work emergency transports, he
was placed on unpaid leave. Eventually, Bailey was terminated for
falsifying information on his application. Bailey sued, and the district
court granted summary judgment on all of his claims.26
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.27 The court held that the
option for working non-emergency transport was a reasonable
accommodation because Bailey’s salary, hours, and duties would all
have remained the same.28 Lastly, the court agreed with the district
court that Bailey could not maintain a claim of retaliation because
Bailey failed to demonstrate that his protected activity, suing his
former employer, was the but-for cause of his termination.29 AMR had a
history of terminating employees who falsified information on their
application, including employees who were not Rastafarians and
employees who did not request accommodation for their religious
beliefs.30

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1270–72.
Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1277–78.
Id. at 1278.
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C. Retaliation
In Babb v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs,31 the Eleventh
Circuit revisited claims asserted by Babb for Title VII retaliation and
hostile work environment.32 Previously, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Babb v. Wilkie,33 and reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s prior
ruling on Babb’s age discrimination claim.34 On remand, the Eleventh
Circuit remanded that claim and the gender discrimination claim and
affirmed summary judgment on the Title VII retaliation and hostile
work environment claim.35 Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit granted
rehearing on the latter issues because Babb argued that the prior
precedent relied upon by the court for the Title VII retaliation claim
was invalidated by the Supreme Court decision, and an intervening
decision undermines the grant of summary judgment for the hostile
work environment claim.36
Plaintiff Norris Babb was a clinical pharmacist for the VA medical
center in Florida.37 The VA instituted a new promotions program, which
Babb and her colleagues believed discriminated on the basis of age and
gender. Babb alleged that her “advanced scope” designation that made
her eligible for promotion was taken away; she was denied training
opportunities and was passed over for positions in the hospital’s
anti-coagulation clinic; and her holiday pay was reduced when she was
placed in a new position.38 She relied on evidence that supervisors made
age-based comments to support her allegations that these personnel
decisions were based at least in part on her age.39
The Supreme Court determined that “age need not be a but-for cause
of an employment decision in order for there to be a violation of [the
federal sector provision under The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)].”40 The key statutory language in the ADEA that the Court
relied on was that plaintiffs must only show that “‘age discrimination
plays any part in the way a decision is made.’”41 With this
determination and reliance on that language, Babb argued that the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

992 F.3d 1193 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1195.
140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020).
Id. at 1178; see also Martin II & Brownback, supra note 1, at 1219–20.
Babb, 992 F.3d at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1196–97.
Id. at 1197.
Id. at 1197 (quoting Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1172).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Eleventh Circuit’s precedent in Trask v. Secretary, Department of
Veterans Affairs,42 which addresses the federal sector provision under
Title VII, must also be overturned.43 The relevant language in Title VII
states: “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees . . . in executive
agencies . . . shall be made free from any discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”44 This language mirrors that in
the ADEA statute. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme
Court’s analysis of the causation standard in its Babb decision should
also apply to Title VII retaliation claims.45 The grant of summary
judgment on the Title VII claim was vacated and the claim was
remanded for adjudication under the new, correct standard.46
As for Babb’s hostile work environment claim, she contended that the
court’s recent decision in Monaghan v. Worldpay U.S. Inc.47 effectively
overruled Gowski v. Peake.48 Babb argued the court’s previous analysis
regarding the hostile work environment claim was based on Gowski.49
Monaghan outlined the separate claims permitted under Title VII
which include disparate treatment based on protected characteristics,
hostile-environment claim, and retaliation.50 In Babb, the Eleventh
Circuit differentiated between typical and retaliatory hostile work
environment claims and concluded that retaliatory hostile-environment
claims arose under the retaliation prong of Title VII rather than the
hostile-environment prong. 51 Thus, that claim was not subject to the
typical severe and pervasive standard. Rather, retaliatory hostile work
environment claims should use the less onerous standard of “might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.”52 This determination effectively overruled
Gowski.53
On rehearing, Babb asked the court to vacate the grant of summary
judgment and remand for reconsideration by the United States District

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

822 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016).
Babb, 992 F.3d at 1200.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (2009).
Babb, 992 F.3d at 1205.
Id.
955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020).
682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012).
Babb, 992 F.3d at 1205–06.
Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 861.
Babb, 992 F.3d at 1207.
Id.
Id.
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Court for the Middle District of Florida under the correct standard.54
The court agreed, vacating and remanding the issue to the district
court.55
Likewise, in Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs,56
the Eleventh Circuit remanded Tonkyro’s retaliation and retaliatory
hostile work environment claims to be reevaluated under the Babb and
Monaghan standards.57
III. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)58 prohibits discrimination
by employers against qualified disabled individuals.59 A “disability”
under the ADA includes “a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities . . . a record of such
impairment; or [] being regarded as having such an impairment.”60
Cases brought under the ADA are examined under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting analysis and employees must first establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.61 To establish a prima facie case of
ADA discrimination, an employee must show “(1) a disability, (2) that
she was otherwise qualified to perform the job, and (3) that she was
discriminated against based upon the disability.”62 If successful, the
burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.63 Once established, “the
presumption of discrimination disappears; however the employee can
still prove discrimination by offering evidence demonstrating that the
employer’s explanation is pretextual.”64
In Todd v. Fayette County School District,65 the Eleventh Circuit
reiterated that employee misconduct may lead to termination even
where the ultimate cause of the employee’s misconduct was an ADA-

54. Id. at 1209.
55. Id.
56. 995 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2021).
57. Id. at 839.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12113 (2008).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2008).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2008).
61. Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004).
62. Id. at 1193.
63. Collado v. United Parcel Service, Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1150 (11th Cir. 2005).
64. Martin II & Brownback, supra note 1 at 1222; 2 Americans with Disabilities:
Practice and Compliance Manual § 7:409 (2022); Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44,
51–52 (2003).
65. 998 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2021).
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protected disability.66 Plaintiff Jerri Todd, a middle school art teacher,
suffered from “major depressive disorder” and successfully managed the
condition for years.67 Unfortunately, Todd’s condition began to spiral
out of control in January of 2017, when she confessed to a coworker that
she had consumed an excessive amount of Xanax while at school. Todd
also repeatedly threatened to kill herself and her son, who was a
student at the school. As a result, Todd was involuntarily admitted to a
behavioral health facility for four days.68 The school would not allow
Todd to resume teaching until the school completed its investigation
and there was assurance that Todd was no longer a threat. During this
time, Todd took leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).69 Todd was later permitted to return to work after clearance
from her doctor.70
Within a month of returning to work, Todd made threatening
statements against her co-workers and administration.71 On April 26,
2017, the school district notified Todd of its decision not to renew her
teaching contract. Todd was provided the opportunity to request a
formal hearing concerning the non-renewal decision, but Todd never
requested such a hearing. Instead, Todd proceeded to file suit against
the school district under the ADA alleging disability discrimination,
FMLA interference, and retaliation under the ADA and FMLA. The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted summary judgment on all claims. Todd thereafter appealed.72
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment.73 The
court noted that although Todd’s detrimental behavior likely stemmed
from her ADA-protected disability, the decision to terminate was not
due to the disorder itself, but rather Todd’s conduct as a result of the
disorder.74 Specifically, the court stated that “the ADA does not ‘require
that employers countenance dangerous misconduct, even if that
misconduct is the result of a disability.’”75 For the issue of pretext, Todd
argued that an issue of material fact existed as to whether she actually

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
2006)).

Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1212.
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654.
Todd, 998 F.3d at 1212–13.
Id. at 1213.
Id. at 1213–14.
Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1217 (quoting Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 172–73 (2d Cir.
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made the threatening statements. The court disposed of this argument
by reaffirming that the focus of a pretext analysis “centers on the
employer’s beliefs, not the employee’s beliefs and, to be blunt about it,
not on reality as it exists outside of the decision maker’s head.”76 Here,
Todd presented no evidence that the decision maker did not honestly
believe that she engaged in this behavior, so her pretext argument
failed.77
IV. SECTION 1983
In Bell v. Sheriff of Broward County,78 Bell, a deputy sheriff, brought
a claim against the Sheriff of Broward County. Deputy Bell alleged
retaliation in violation of his right of free speech under the First
Amendment.79 The Eleventh Circuit upheld the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida’s dismissal of the suit and
concluded that a five-day paid suspension did not establish an adverse
action for a First Amendment retaliation claim.80
Bell was placed on paid suspension after writing an opinion article
for the South Florida Sun Sentinel.81 In that article, Bell opined that
although the Sheriff stated otherwise, the Sheriff was not prepared for
the COVID-19 pandemic and had failed to provide sufficient personal
protective equipment to the employees of the Broward County Sheriff’s
Office. Four days after Bell’s article was published, Bell emailed a letter
to the Sheriff requesting a meeting to discuss personal protective
equipment and as an opportunity to curtail threats the Sheriff had
made. The Sheriff claimed that Bell’s statements were untrue. On the
same day that the Sheriff received Bell’s email, Bell was suspended
with pay pending an investigation into whether Bell’s statements
constituted violations of the Broward County Sheriff’s Office’s policies
involving truthfulness, corrupt practices, and conduct unbecoming.
Bell’s investigation was conducted by the Office’s Internal Affairs
Department. Subsequently, just five days after being placed on this
paid suspension, Bell filed suit against the Sheriff pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Bell claimed that in the Sheriff’s official capacity, he had
violated Bell’s First Amendment rights of free speech and association by

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1218.
Id.
6 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1375.
Id.
Id.
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suspending him with pay. In response, the Sheriff moved to dismiss
Bell’s action.82
The district court concluded that Bell’s comments in the article were
made as a citizen, and not in his capacity as a deputy of the Broward
County Sheriff’s Office.83 Applying the balancing test enunciated in
Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205,84
the district court further found that Bell’s comments regarding the
COVID-19 pandemic and personal protective equipment involved a
matter of public concern, which outweighed the interests of the
Sheriff.85 Nevertheless, the district court granted the Sheriff’s motion to
dismiss due to its finding that Bell failed to allege that he had been
subjected to adverse employment action. Bell’s suspension with pay
during the pendency of an internal investigation into his alleged
misconduct was not an adverse employment action under controlling
Eleventh Circuit precedent. 86
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court’s dismissal, holding
that an adverse employment action must involve an important
condition of employment, such as discharge, demotion, refusal to hire or
promote, and reprimands.87 Bell’s paid five-day suspension pending an
investigation into his conduct was not an adverse action.88
V. FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
The FMLA prohibits employers from interfering with, restraining, or
denying the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, certain enumerated
rights.89 The Eleventh Circuit recognizes two claims from aggrieved
employees—retaliation and interference claims.90 Under the FMLA, an
employee is entitled to take twelve weeks of leave over a twelve-month
period for their own serious health condition or the serious health
condition of a family member and then be reinstated upon their return
from leave.91 For interference claims, employees must prove that they

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
2017).
91.

Id. at 1375–76.
Id. at 1376.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Bell, 6 F.4th at 1376.
Id.
Id. at 1379 (citing Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 618 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 1379.
29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1) (1993).
Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Del., LLC, 854 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir.
Id. at 1267.
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were denied their benefits under the FMLA.92 However, the denial of a
benefit is not the only way employers can interfere with the rights of an
employee; an employer may also be responsible for interference for
conduct that discourages employees from using the leave to which they
are entitled.93
As for retaliation, an employee must prove that the employer
“intentionally discriminated against him in the form of an adverse
employment action for having exercised a FMLA right.”94 This can be
shown either through direct or circumstantial evidence.95 Where there
is only circumstantial evidence, the courts will apply the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting analysis.96
In Ramji v. Hospital Housekeeping Systems, LLC,97 the Eleventh
Circuit overturned the grant of summary judgment for the defendant.98
The court held that Hospital Housekeeping (HH) failed to provide notice
of FMLA rights and interfered with its employee Noorjahan Ramji’s
right to job-protected leave under the FMLA.99 Ramji injured her knee
while at work, and HH handled the injury solely under Workers’
Compensation policies and procedures. Following her accident, Ramji
was out of work for eleven days before returning to a light-duty
position.100
Ramji used sick time to cover these days.101 During that period,
Ramji had an appointment with an orthopedic doctor who diagnosed
her with right knee pain and derangement and prescribed physical
therapy and light duty. Ramji participated in physical therapy as
prescribed, and HH provided her a light-duty position that fit within
her restrictions for approximately a month until her follow-up
appointment with the orthopedic doctor. At her follow-up appointment,
Ramji was released to full duty.102 Ramji returned to work that day and
was required to complete an Essential Functions Test, which required
that she successfully complete a number of tasks related to her job
duties. If Ramji could not successfully complete these tasks, she would
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1270 (citing Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of City of Birmingham,
239 F.3d 1199, 1207 (11th Cir. 2001)).
95. Jones, 854 F.3d. at 1270.
96. Id. at 1271; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
97. 992 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2021).
98. Id. at 1248.
99. Id. at 1236–37.
100. Id. at 1236.
101. Id. at 1237.
102. Id. at 1238.
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be subject to termination. Ramji could not complete the task because
the pain returned in her knee. Ramji asked if she could have additional
leave and use her accrued sick and vacation leave to recover and
continue physical therapy. This was denied, and Ramji was
terminated.103
Ramji filed suit against HH, claiming it interfered with the exercise
of her rights under the FMLA.104 On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia granted summary judgment for HH and denied it for Ramji.
The court held that because Ramji’s doctor cleared her and stated that
Ramji reached maximum medical improvement, Ramji was not entitled
to the protections of the FMLA. Because Ramji was cleared, the court
reasoned that HH could not have concluded that Ramji was entitled to
any leave under the FMLA.105 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated
this decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.106
First, the Eleventh Circuit held that Ramji clearly met all of the
requirements to be eligible under the FMLA.107
An employee is entitled to FMLA leave if she has “a serious health
condition that makes [her] unable to perform the functions of [her]
position . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). A “serious health condition”
means “an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental
condition that involves . . . continuing treatment by a health care
provider.” Id. § 2611(11)(B). To qualify as “continuing treatment”
under FMLA regulations, treatment (1) must involve a period of
incapacity of more than three consecutive, full calendar days, and (2)
must require either (a) treatment by a healthcare provider at least
twice within 30 days of the first day of incapacity or (b) treatment by
a healthcare provider at least once that results in a regimen of
continuing treatment under the supervision of the healthcare
provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a)(1)–(a)(2).108

Following her injury, Ramji was excused from work for more than
three consecutive days.109 Ramji then sought treatment from an
orthopedic physician who prescribed recurring physical therapy and a
follow-up appointment to assess Ramji’s injury. Therefore, Ramji had a

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1236–39.
Id. at 1240.
Id. at 1240–41.
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1242.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
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serious health condition that caused Ramji to be unable to perform the
essential functions of her job. Interestingly, Pamela Merriweather,
HH’s FMLA Administrator, attended all appointments with Ramji and
was acutely aware of everything going on with her injury.110 Therefore,
the court was not convinced that HH was not on notice or provided with
enough information that Ramji was possibly qualified for protected
leave.111
HH argued that it was not required to provide notice because the
injury was handled through workers’ compensation, so Ramji was paid
for all of the excused time off.112 Further, HH claimed that since Ramji
was allowed to return to light duty on the final day that HH could
provide notice under FMLA deadlines, it no longer needed to provide
her with notice because she did not qualify.113 The court found no merit
to these arguments.114 First, FMLA regulations specifically state that
“the workers’ compensation absence and FMLA leave may run
concurrently.”115 Second, as to the light-duty designation, “FMLA
regulations unambiguously prohibit precisely this employer conduct:
‘[i]f FMLA entitles an employee to leave, an employer may not, in lieu of
FMLA leave entitlement, require an employee to take a job with a
reasonable accommodation.’”116 Ramji never had an option to decline
the light-duty position in favor of taking FMLA leave to continue
recovering.117
HH argued that even if she had been offered the protected leave,
Ramji was not harmed or prejudiced because it took her eight months to
completely recover since she ultimately needed total knee
replacement.118 The court rejected this assertion and found that Ramji
could demonstrate harm on two fronts: (1) she was not reinstated to her
position, and (2) she was denied a lump sum payment for her sick
leave/vacation.119 By denying Ramji the opportunity to make an
informed decision about whether to take FMLA leave, she continued
with the Essential Functions Test, which very well could have
exacerbated her injury and because of her termination, she was unable

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 1242–43.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1244.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1244 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(d)(2) (2013)).

Id. at 1244–45 (emphasis in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(d)(1)).
Id. at 1245.
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1246–48.
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to attend continuous physical therapy because costs were prohibitive.120
This caused her harm both physically and financially.121 Based on the
foregoing, the court vacated the grant of summary judgment to HH and
remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.122
In Matamoros v. Broward County Sheriff’s Office,123 the Eleventh
Circuit held that Matamoros was not entitled to FMLA leave because
there were no adverse actions against Matamoros in retaliation of her
exercising her FMLA rights.124 The Eleventh Circuit ultimately
affirmed the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on
Matamoros’s claims.125
Carolina Matamoros worked for the Broward County Sheriff’s Office
as a communications operator beginning in 2010.126 Her son suffered
from severe asthma, and in March 2016 she took FMLA leave to care
for him. At some point later in her employment, Matamoros applied for
a part-time position but did not receive it. Irritated by that fact,
Matamoros filed an internal grievance which was also denied. Soon
thereafter, Matamoros requested additional FMLA leave, which the
Sheriff’s Office did not approve. Eventually, Matamoros did receive a
part-time position, but she began receiving several kinds of disciplinary
actions because of recurrent attendance issues. The Sheriff’s Office
initiated an internal affairs investigation into Matamoros frequently
missing work.127
The internal investigation revealed that Matamoros’s attendance
issues were due to Matamoros simultaneously working another job.128
This was even though Matamoros had previously given a sworn
statement to the Sheriff’s Office stating that she did not have a second
job. The investigation revealed that Matamoros had worked more for
her other employer than for the Sheriff’s Office, and on seventeen
occasions, Matamoros had called in sick or taken sick leave from the
Sheriff’s Office while working her other job. Due to these investigative
findings, the Sheriff’s Office suspended Matamoros without pay for two
months. Matamoros then filed a charge with the Equal Employment
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1248.
Id.
Id.
2 F.4th 1329 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1335–36.
Id. at 1331.
Id.
Id.
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Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging disparate treatment because
of her son’s disability. Shortly thereafter, Matamoros again requested
additional FMLA leave in order to care for her asthmatic son. However,
the Sheriff’s Office denied her request for additional FMLA leave and
suspended Matamoros for a third time. Eventually, the Sheriff’s Office
terminated Matamoros.129
In analyzing Matamoros’s FMLA claims, the court noted that
Matamoros’s FMLA interference claim failed because she had not
demonstrated that she was even entitled to receive FMLA leave.130 In
order to be eligible to receive FMLA leave, Matamoros had to prove that
she had worked at least 1,250 hours in the twelve months preceding her
leave request; however during that time, she had worked fewer than
1,100 hours for the Sheriff’s Office.131 Although the Eleventh Circuit’s
determination that Matamoros was not eligible for protection under the
FMLA, similarly defeating her FMLA retaliation claim; the court still
noted that the Sheriff’s Office had set forth legitimate business reasons
for its suspensions and termination of Matamoros, including providing
a false statement under oath, calling in sick while simultaneously
reporting for work for another employer, and poor job performance.132
Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment
on all of Matamoros’s claims.133
VI. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
The Fair Labor and Standards Act (FLSA)134 requires employers to
pay covered employees engaged in commerce a minimum of $7.25 for all
hours worked.135 Unless an employee falls within one of the statutory
exemptions, if an employee works over forty hours in any workweek,
the employer is also required to pay that employee overtime at a rate of
one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate.136 Employees can be
“covered” by the FLSA in one of two ways: enterprise coverage or
individual coverage.137 For enterprise coverage, an employee must work
for an employer that has at least two employees and has an annual

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1331–32.
Id. at 1338.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1339.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2016).
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2010).
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (2018).
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dollar of sales or business done of at least $500,000.138 An employee
may be covered individually if their work regularly involves them in
commerce between the states and they are “engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce[.]”139
In Rafferty v. Denny’s,140 the Eleventh Circuit held that a waitress
presented questions of fact as to the non-tipped labor she was
performing, and thus overturned a grant of summary judgment for the
employer and sent the case to trial.141 A Denny’s server, Lindsey
Rafferty, claimed that she was not paid all compensation owed because
Denny’s was paying her the sub-minimum wage rate for both her tipped
work and her untipped duties that were not related to her tipped
work.142 To determine the correct amount of compensation, the court
conducted an in-depth analysis of the history of the 1967 Dual-Job
regulation,143 at issue and the Department of Labor’s (DOL) subsequent
interpretations of that regulation, including a 2018 Opinion Letter.144
Generally, under the tip credit rule, employers are permitted to pay
tipped employees a sub-minimum wage rate, only if the tips the
employee received are at least equal to the difference in the rate and
federal minimum wage of $7.25.145 The DOL promulgated the dual-job
regulation that outlines the situations where an employee is performing
separate jobs and must be paid different wages, as opposed to
performing untipped duties related to his or her tipped occupation.146
The DOL refined its guidance on this regulation over the years to guide
employers on when they could take the tip-credit, and the court
extracted the following rules from that guidance:
(1) An employer cannot take the tip credit for time an employee spent
performing duties that were unrelated to the tipped occupation.
(2) An employer can take the tip credit for time an employee
performed duties related to her tipped occupation, provided that

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
13 F.4th 1166 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1169.
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 531.56 (2021).
Rafferty, 13 F.4th at 1171–72.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1173.
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those duties were not performed by that employee for more than
twenty percent of her working hours.147

In 2018, the DOL issued an Opinion Letter148 that abandoned the
“limitation on the amount of duties related to a tip-producing
occupation that a tipped employee may perform, ‘so long as those duties
are performed contemporaneously with direct customer-service duties
and all other requirements of the Act are met.’”149 Further the Opinion
Letter was set to create a database that employers could use to
determine whether certain duties were related to their employees’ tipproducing occupation.150 The DOL issued a proposed rule that captured
the guidance outlined in the Opinion Letter, but the rule underwent
multiple revisions before the DOL again changed course in 2021 and
reverted back to the 80/20 rule.151
Here, Rafferty claimed that she spent more than 20% of her time
conducting side work such as cleaning, food preparation, hosting, etc.152
In granting summary judgment to Denny’s, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida relied on the 2018 Opinion
Letter to determine that Rafferty “had not provided any evidence that
she had conducted ‘sidework’ at any time that was not
‘contemporaneous’ with her tip-related activities.”153 In reversing the
grant of summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit held that the 2018
Opinion Letter was owed no deference under either the Auer,154 or
Skidmore155 deference standards because the letter was “not a
reasonable interpretation of the dual-jobs regulation[.]”156 Because no
deference was to be given to this Opinion Letter, a question of fact
remained as to whether Rafferty performed related duties more than
20% of the time and to what extent Rafferty participated in activity that

147. Id. at 1175 (emphasis in original).
148. U.S. Dep’t Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Op. Ltr. FLSA-2018-27, 2018 WL 5921455
at *1 (Nov. 18, 2018).
149. Id. at 1176 (emphasis in original) (quoting DOL WHD Op. Ltr. 2018 WL
5921455).
150. Id. at 1176.
151. Id. at 1177–78.
152. Id. at 1190.
153. Id. at 1171.
154. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
155. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
156. Rafferty, 13 F.4th at 1185. (emphasis omitted)
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was not related to her tipped work.157 Therefore, the court remanded
the case to determine those issues.158
In Hernandez v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc.,159 the Eleventh Circuit
held that the fluctuating work week method is not precluded by
providing the employee with additional shift premium or holiday pay.160
Hector Hernandez worked as a process and maintenance technician in
Plastipak Packaging’s Plant City (Plastipak), a Florida facility from
2011 until 2016. He was classified as a salaried, non-exempt employee
with a fixed biweekly salary of $1,964.99, and his hours varied from
week to week. Plastipak also paid Hernandez a shift premium when he
worked the night shift for a week, prorated if he worked less than a
week, and holiday pay. Hernandez now claimed that the shift premium
and holiday pay precluded Plastipak from using the fluctuating
workweek method. Thus, he should have been paid time and a half for
all overtime worked. The district court agreed and awarded Hernandez
a total of $1,870.52 in back pay for the statutory period.161 The Eleventh
Circuit disagreed, overturning and remanding this decision for the
district court to determine if overtime was owed consistent with its
decision.162
Interestingly, Plastipak paid more to salaried, non-exempt employees
under the fluctuating workweek model than is required under the
law.163 Under the fluctuating workweek:
For workers with a fixed salary and variable weekly hours, the
employer can use the fluctuating workweek method to determine
overtime pay. Under this approach, the employer calculates the
employee’s regular rate by “dividing [the weekly] salary by the
number of hours actually worked” that week. Lamonica v. Safe
Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1311 (11th Cir. 2013). When
using this method, an employer need only pay for overtime hours at a
rate of one-half times the employee’s regular rate—not at one and
one-half times. That’s because the employee “has already been
compensated at the straight time regular rate” for those hours “under
the salary arrangement.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Condo v.
Sysco Corp., 1 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The fixed salary
compensates the employee [working variable hours] for all his hours,

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1195.
15 F.4th 1321 (11th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1323–25.
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1322–23.
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the overtime ones included. He therefore receives 100% of his regular
rate for each hour that he worked. As such, he is entitled only to an
additional fifty percent of his regular rate for the hours that he
worked in excess of forty.” (emphasis omitted)).164

In contrast, the fluctuating workweek for Plastipak divided
employees’ weekly salary by forty hours, no matter how many hours
they worked, and then multiplied the regular rate by the number of
overtime hours instead of using a half-time rate.165 This would always
result in more overtime pay for the employee than is required under the
fluctuating workweek.166
In overturning the district court, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with
the conclusion that the shift premium and holiday pay “offended” the
requirement under the fluctuating workweek that there be a “fixed
weekly salary.”167 In coming to its conclusion, the court differentiated
between a “fixed weekly salary” and a “fixed total compensation
package.”168 Here, the court viewed the bonuses and holiday pay, which
were previously permitted by DOL guidance and regulations, as
additional compensation apart from the fixed salary that Hernandez
received on a weekly basis.169 Therefore, the court held that the
requirements of the fluctuating workweek were met and applied to
Hernandez’s situation.170 It remanded the case to ensure that all
overtime requirements were met under the fluctuating workweek. 171
In Gelber v. Akal Security, Inc.,172 the Eleventh Circuit held that an
employer could not automatically deduct a one-hour meal period from
its employees’ compensable overtime.173 Akal Security (Akal) transports
detainees who have been ordered to be removed from the United States
either domestically to another detention center or internationally to
another country. These transportation flights are staffed with air
security officers to ensure safety. However, after the detained persons
have been transported, the staff is essentially relieved from duty on the
return flight—namely, free to sleep, watch TV, and play video games—

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 1323. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1326–27.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1322.
Id.
14 F.4th 1279 (11th Cir. 2021).
Gelber, 14 F.4th at 1280–81.
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until they get back to the airport where employees have some
administrative tasks to perform. Akal did not dispute that it must
compensate these employees for the time spent on the return flight
despite being free to do whatever they want. However, Akal had a
practice of automatically deducting one-hour meal periods for flights in
excess of ninety minutes. During this one-hour meal period they were to
cease all work activities and use the time as they wished.174 The district
court determined that this automatic deduction violated the FLSA, but
Akal acted in good faith and did not willfully violate the FLSA.175 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed.176
Under 29 C.F.R. § 785.19,177 whether a meal break is compensable
depends on if it is a “bona fide” meal break—that is, the employee is
“completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular
meals.”178 If the employee “is required to perform any duties, whether
active or inactive, while eating” then it is not a “bona fide” meal
break.179 To analyze these issues it is necessary to determine who bears
the burden of proof and what evidence is required to overcome the
employee’s claim that the time is compensable.180 The court determined
as a matter of first impression that there should be a burden shifting
analysis in these situations.181 Specifically, “once an employee satisfies
his burden by showing that his logged work hours are generally
compensable, the employer bears the burden of proving that the carvedout meal periods were bona fide.”182
Here, by Akal’s own admission the idle time on the return trips was
compensable time.183 Through this admission, Akal acknowledged that
the idle time on the return trip is “spent predominantly for Akal’s
benefit.”184 So to overcome its burden, Akal had to point to something
other than the fact that the employees were idle on the flight, and it
failed to do so.185 Akal failed to carry this burden, and thus the
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Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1289.
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29 C.F.R. § 785.19 (1961).
Gelber, 14 F.4th at 1281–82 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a) (1961)).
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Id. at 1282.
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employees were entitled to back pay for the meal period that was
automatically deducted on the return trip.186
As for the issues of willfulness and good faith, the Eleventh Circuit
determined that the district court did not err in finding good faith and
no willfulness by Akal.187 A finding of good faith precludes recovery of
liquidated damages by the employees, and a finding of no willfulness
sets the statute of limitations at two years instead of three.188 Here,
there was an adequate showing that Akal sought guidance from outside
counsel on this issue, and outside counsel advised that Akal’s
procedures were legal under the FLSA.189 Being that the court has not
addressed this issue prior to this case, it held that this interpretation
was reasonable.190 Further, there was no evidence that Akal knew its
conduct was prohibited by the FLSA.191 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld the findings of the district court on these issues.192
The FLSA provides unique exemptions from its overtime provisions.
The Eleventh Circuit in Ramirez v. Statewide Harvesting & Hauling,
LLC,193 addressed a nuanced issue under an agricultural exemption.194
The agricultural exemption applies to “any employee employed in
agriculture[.]”195 Agriculture is defined as “the cultivation and tillage of
the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting
of any agricultural or horticultural commodities . . . , and the raising of
livestock, bees, fur-bearing animals, or poultry.”196 Agriculture can also
mean “any practices . . . performed by a farmer or on a farm as an
incident to or in conjunction with primary farming operations, including
preparation for market and delivery to storage or to market or to
carriers for transportation to market.”197
Statewide Harvesting & Hauling, LLC (Statewide) facilitates the
harvesting of fruit from various farms across Florida, and most of its
employees are temp workers under the federal H-2A program.198 As
part of the program, employers must provide these employees with
186.
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basic necessities such as housing, meals or kitchen facilities, and
laundry facilities. To abide by this requirement, Statewide required
that its crew leaders not only supervise the workers while they were in
the field, but also take them on weekly trips to the grocery store,
laundromat, and bank. This amounted to about four hours per week.
The crew leaders sued Statewide claiming they were entitled to
overtime for the hours spent transporting the workers. The district
court agreed and held that the exemption did not apply to these
activities because the trips did not fall under either definition of
“agriculture,” and specifically were “activities performed neither by a
farmer nor on a farm” as prescribed in the secondary definition.199
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the finding for the
employees.200 The court reasoned that transportation for necessities
could not fall under the secondary definition for multiple reasons.201
First, the definition required that the activities be “performed . . . on a
farm,” and nothing about these necessity trips was in the geographical
area of the farm.202 Second, the statute requires that the activities be
performed on a single farm.203 Here, the workers were assigned to work
in various farms across the state at any given time, so these necessity
trips could not be tied to a singular farm.204 For these reasons, the court
held that Statewide could not claim the agricultural exemption for the
time spent by the crew leaders on these trips, and if the crew leaders
worked more than forty hours in a given workweek, then they would be
entitled to overtime pay for the time spent on these trips.205
VII. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)206 was enacted in 1935 to
give employees the right to form and join unions while also requiring
employers to engage in the collective bargaining process with the
bargaining representative chosen by its employees.207 The NLRA
achieves this by protecting employees’ “full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing,
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
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29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947).

2022

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

1327

employment or other mutual aid or protection.”208 The NLRA is
enforced by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).209 The NLRB
is comprised of five members nominated by the President and confirmed
by the Senate, with its primary responsibilities being to protect
employee rights under the NLRA, to prevent unfair labor practices, and
to interpret the NLRA.210 The NLRA and the NLRB protect not only
unionized work forces but also non-unionized employees’ rights to selforganize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their
choosing, “and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection[.]”211
In Ridgewood Health Care Center, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board,212 the employer, Ridgewood, petitioned the Eleventh Circuit to
review a decision of the NLRB. The NLRB decision found that
Ridgewood committed several unfair labor practices.213 Ridgewood
owned a nursing home and leased it to Preferred Health Holdings, LLC
(Preferred). Preferred handled all of the operations, employees, and so
forth, and Ridgewood’s only involvement in the facility was collecting
lease payments. This lease was terminated effective September 30,
2013, and Ridgewood took steps to start its own operations on October
1, 2013.214
Ridgewood sought to recruit Preferred employees, encouraged those
employees to apply, and offered a three-week application period
exclusively for these employees.215 A total of eighty-three Preferred
employees applied and ultimately fifty-three were hired for positions at
Ridgewood. When hiring was opened to the general public, Ridgewood
Services added another fifty-six hires. With Preferred, the employees
were represented by a union. As a result, during the hiring process, the
union and Ridgewood disputed the application of the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) to the newly hired group of employees.216
When Ridgewood refused to bargain under the current CBA, the union
filed a series of unfair labor charges for certain occurrences. The union
filed unfair labor charges against Ridgewood for failure to bargain,
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scheming to “create a workforce composed of less than a majority of the
predecessor’s
employees[,] . . .
coercively
‘interrogat[ing]
job
applicants . . . about their union membership and union activities,’
[and] ‘refus[ing] to hire Preferred employees . . . because of their union
and protected activities[.]’”217
Following a hearing on these charges, an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) determined that Ridgewood was a successor employer under
NLRB v. Burns International Security,218 and was obligated to bargain
with the union.219 Because it was a successor employer, its actions
violated sections 58(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA when it refused to
bargain with the union; unilaterally changed the terms of employment;
refused to provide the union with information it requested; interrogated
job applicants about their union status; threatened to terminate an
employee if she engaged in union activity; and engaged in a
discriminatory hiring scheme to avoid bargaining obligations.220 The
NLRB affirmed this decision, and Ridgewood appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit, which was ultimately granted in full.221 On review, the
Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement against Ridgewood for all
contested findings. 222
The Eleventh Circuit held that Ridgewood did not participate in
coercive interrogations of applicants.223 The NLRA allows employees to
inquire on matters that relate to unionizing and collective bargaining
without violating the statute as long as the words used or the context do
not “suggest an element of coercion or interference.”224 Here, the NLRB
did not conduct any analysis of the legal factors outlined in NLRB v.
Gaylord Chem. Co.,225 instead the NLRB declared as a matter of law
that Ridgewood violated the NLRA by interrogating the applicants
about their union membership.226 When the Eleventh Circuit reviewed
the factors,227 it concluded that “the record evidence can support only

217. Id. at 1272.
218. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
219. Ridgewood, 8 F.4th at 1273.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1273, 1275.
222. Id. at 1285. Ridgewood did not contest the NLRB’s determination that the threat
to terminate an employee if she engaged in union activity was an unfair labor charge, so
this claim was granted enforcement.
223. Id. at 1276.
224. Id. at 1275.
225. 824 F.3d 1318, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016).
226. Ridgewood, 8 F.4th at 1276.
227. These factors are:
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one conclusion: Ridgewood did not coercively interrogate Preferred job
applicants.”228 The court reasoned that the applicants told the truth in
the interview, which cuts against the element of coercion or
interference; no one who was asked questions about the union suffered
adverse consequences—they were all offered positions; “[T]here was no
systematic effort to inquire about Union status” and lastly, no applicant
testified that they felt coerced.229
It is well established that “a new owner cannot refuse to hire the
employees of her predecessor solely because they were union members
or to avoid having to recognize the union.”230 The court utilized the
burden shifting analysis outlined in Wright Line231 to determine
whether Ridgewood violated the NLRA in their hiring process.232
To begin, the claimant must show “by a preponderance of the
evidence that a protected activity was a motivating factor in the
employer’s adverse decision.”233 The burden then shifts to the employer
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not have hired
the employee because of some legitimate reason regardless of their
protected activity.234 If the employer can show this affirmative defense,
then the burden shifts back to the claimant to show that the proffered
reason or explanation is pretextual.235 The court held that the refusal to
hire four employees because they were previously marked ineligible for
rehire was a legitimate reason, and there was no showing of pretext.236
Despite the findings of the NLRB, the court held that Ridgewood did
not engage in a discriminatory scheme to deny union members
employment.237 The NLRB based its determination on three things: (1)

(1) the history of the employer’s attitude toward its employees; (2) the type of
information sought; (3) the rank of the official of the employer in the
employer’s hierarchy; (4) the place and manner of the conversation; (5) the
truthfulness of the employee’s reply; (6) whether the employer has a valid
purpose in obtaining information concerning the union; (7) whether this valid
purpose, if existent, is communicated to the employees; and (8) whether the
employer assures the employees that no reprisals will be taken if they support
the union.
Id. at 1275–76.
228. Id. at 1277.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1279.
231. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1088–89 (1980).
232. Ridgewood, 8 F.4th at 1279.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1284.
237. Id.
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coercive interrogation of applicants; (2) the owner threatening to close
the Ridgewood facility if employees unionized; and (3) a supervisor
threating to terminate an employee if she was involved in union
organizing.238 As outlined above, the court was not persuaded by the
coercive interrogation reasoning.239 As for the owner’s statement—that
it was possible that the facility would shut down if a union came in—
the court stated that there is “nothing unlawful about a company’s
opposition to a union[,]” especially when the statement is not actually
threatening.240 Specifically, the court stated that “‘general references to
‘possibilities’ are inadequate to establish that the employer threatened’
employees.”241 Lastly, it rejected the assertion that a statement from a
supervisor, who was not involved in the hiring process, four months
after hiring was complete was enough to infer animus or bias on the
hiring process.242 It held that there was no basis for imputing a bias of a
lower-level supervisor on individuals involved in the hiring process.243
In rejecting the reasoning asserted by the NLRB below, the Eleventh
Circuit held that there was not in fact substantial evidence to find a
discriminatory hiring scheme.244
The last issue resolved by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal was
whether Ridgewood was a successor under the Burns analysis and was
thereby obligated to engage in bargaining with the union.245 “Under
Burns, a successor employer is obligated to bargain with the
predecessor union when (1) there is a ‘substantial continuity’ of
business operations ‘between the enterprises,’ and (2) a majority of the
successor’s substantial complement of employees was employed by the
predecessor.”246 The court overruled the idea that Ridgewood was a
successor.247 The parties only disputed whether a majority of employees
was employed by the predecessor.248 On October 1, 2013, 101 employees
showed up for work when Ridgewood took over the operations.249 Of

238. Id. at 1279–80.
239. Id. at 1280.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 1281 (quoting Decision and Order, Miller Industries Towing Equipment,
Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1075 (2004)).
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those 101 employees, only forty-nine were former Preferred employees
and the remaining fifty-two were non-Preferred employees.250 The
NLRB, below, held that if there was not a discriminatory scheme in
place to keep out union members—three employees who were not hired
that were members of the union—then there would have been a
majority.251 However, the court disposed of this argument on multiple
fronts.252 First, as outlined above, there was no discriminatory hiring
scheme, therefore the union should not have received credit for these
employees who were not hired.253 Second, the court held that there was
no evidence that these employees would have replaced non-Preferred
employees in positions—the hiring was not capped at 101, and this is
supported by the fact that Ridgewood continued to hire employees for
positions after October 1.254 In conclusion, the court granted
Ridgewood’s petition in full and denied the General Counsel’s petition
for enforcement as to all the findings by the NLRB.255
VIII. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, the issues arising under labor and
employment law are becoming progressively more challenging each
year. Regardless of whether a practitioner specializes in state, federal,
administrative, or other matters pertaining to labor and employment, it
is important to recognize and stay abreast of the ever-evolving trends,
policies, cases, and federal guidelines. While the way in which the law
will evolve and change remains to be seen, the cases above give
practitioners some guidance for the time being.
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